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Cebrowski: President’s Forum

Vice Admiral Cebrowski commanded Fighter Squadron
41 and Carrier Air Wing 8, both embarked in USS
Nimitz (CVN 68). He later commanded the assault
ship USS Guam (LPH 9) and, during Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the aircraft carrier
USS Midway (CV 41). Following promotion to flag
rank he became Commander, Carrier Group 6 and
Commander, USS America Battle Group. In addition
to combat deployments to Vietnam and the Persian
Gulf, he has deployed in support of United Nations
operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. He has served
with the U.S. Air Force; the staff of Commander in
Chief, Atlantic Fleet; the staff of the Chief of Naval
Operations, on four occasions; with the Joint Staff
(as J6); and as Director, Navy Space, Information Warfare, and Command and Control (N6). Vice Admiral
Cebrowski became the forty-seventh President of the
Naval War College in July 1998.
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America’s international status and global interests require that
our forces have as their operating domain not only the majority of
the earth’s surface, but also the skies and space above, the ocean
depths below, and the electronic environment we think of as
cyberspace.

T

HE TITLE OF THESE NOTES might well be “Stronghold Lost.”

During our March intersessional conference, the importance of geography in
the Information Age was debated. The U.S. military has already demonstrated
that, as information is substituted for mass, military forces can respond more
rapidly and overcome many of the traditional impediments imposed by geography. We further hear that in Information Age war the occupation of terrain may
not always be a legitimate objective of military operations. These arguments
combine to challenge traditional thinking about the priority of geography—strategically, operationally, and tactically. Care must be taken lest we make
judgments which are too broad, resulting in decisions which increase risk.
The concept of a stronghold is closely linked to key elements of geography in
both time and space. Strongholds are places of security for friendly forces, areas
that the enemy cannot reach and his forces cannot effectively threaten. This concept is deeply imbedded in military thinking. Traditionally, strongholds were
situated where geographic features suggested, as at West Point on the Hudson
River during the American Revolution or Fort McHenry protecting Baltimore’s
Inner Harbor in 1814; sometimes, however, they were created as military expedience dictated, as in “circling the wagons” on the American Great Plains. Either
way, to be able to fight from a stronghold is a great advantage. To allow an enemy
a stronghold is to yield to him some degree of control over the initial conditions
of an engagement. Because of the way that a war proceeds, small changes in initial
conditions can result in profound changes in outcome. This is why controlling
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the initial conditions, holding the initiative, and fighting from strongholds are
so important.
More than ten years ago, historian Colin Gray asserted that America has had
the wonderful blessing of never having to fight for its survival at the start of a
war. To put it bluntly, America has become accustomed to playing “away games.”
Bordered by two vast oceans and two friendly neighbors, America has enjoyed
the great strategic advantage of being a secure stronghold. With that advantage,
America has decided which wars to fight and whether to win or lose them. But
now, many argue that even if Gray still is right today, he will not be so for long:
the preferred American way of war is increasingly at risk.
The prospect of national vulnerability affects the security policies and decisions of the new administration. It casts a different light on the controversial
subject of missile defense and places it in the context of a far larger issue. The loss
of the homeland stronghold indicates a requirement for a broad program, of
which missile defense is but a part. A global power with global interests quite
naturally wants to be able to use all the instruments of national power for policy
purposes ranging from homeland defense through the projection of national
values. But, in the case of America, the growing vulnerability of our nation itself
may restrict, if not exclude, some options at all levels of security planning.
Our national preference (and a moral imperative) is to deliberate at length
whether to go to war. Once war is decided upon, this nation traditionally builds a
coalition, preferably including nations near the scene of action, and moves
forces forward en masse. A forward stronghold is created with the acquiescence
and assistance of coalition partners in the region. Alternatively, a stronghold can
be created at sea. Commanders maneuver their forces to create secure operational zones if only for brief, necessary periods.
Thus, we see the concept of stronghold manifested at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Americans prefer this approach for the same
reason that potential enemies seek to prevent us from using it. In fact, we like the
concept of strongholds so much that the nation is willing to go to extraordinary
lengths to create and maintain them. I hardly need to remind readers that in
World War II we suspended the civil rights of Japanese-Americans because their
very presence was thought to be an internal threat to the national stronghold.
During the Cold War, we adopted the seemingly perverse strategy of mutually
assured destruction in the hope that, with both sides’ strongholds vulnerable to
devastation, neither side would dare attack at that level.
Today, for example, at the highest governmental level the use of chemical or
biological weapons is declared to be unacceptable, and it is a national goal that
certain technologies will not be allowed to proliferate. By invoking prohibitions
in this way the nation seeks to establish universally acknowledged strongholds.
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A strategic example is the decision to dominate the sea, air, space, and cyberspace
as operating domains. At the level of grand strategy we speak of the concept of
“projecting defense” as a means of coalition creation and assurance. This defensive concept extends to the operational level of war when we employ forward
basing, either ashore or afloat. At the tactical level of war, strongholds can be created in locale with maneuver, or in time with speed. The techniques used normally depend on the physics of the systems involved and on the environment.
Tactically, the duration of a stronghold may need to be only seconds, or perhaps less.
What are the implications for the Navy? From the perspective of strategy, the
Navy must train, equip, and operate to maximize its capabilities in its operating
domain. America’s international status and global interests require that our
forces have as their operating domain not only the majority of the earth’s surface,
but also the skies and space above, the ocean depths below, and the electronic
environment we think of as cyberspace. Here, the U.S. Navy must predominate.
At the operational level of war, the Navy must guarantee both speed of deployment and speed of employment of force. Time lost in the creation of a
stronghold in effect grants a stronghold to the enemy. This suggests a need for
forces which are capable of clearing distant seas of mines and enemy submarines, while projecting air and missile defense and essential elements of the joint
force, including sensors and command and control capabilities, all at high speed
in the opening days or even hours of a conflict.
The critical planning requirement at the tactical level of war is to offset the
emerging condition of tactical instability. Tactical instability occurs when unit
or force capability is allowed to increase disproportionately to survivability,
which is staying power under stress. What tactical instability produces is a force
which has to be risk averse. Such a force is unable to conduct sustained operations in heavily contested areas; by extension, then, it is unable to support other
elements of the joint force in such areas. In the case of the U.S. Navy, if highly capable units are too vulnerable to operate in littoral regions, the Navy cannot perform missions itself nor support joint and coalition forces in those regions. The
point is not that the Navy must be able to create a permanent geographic stronghold in the close-in littoral for any and every purpose, but that it must be able to
fight and sustain forces whenever and wherever that is required. The consequence of tactical instability will be that an enemy will enjoy the advantages of
operating from a stronghold, one that contains the vast majority of the world’s
population, the sources of much of the world’s wealth, and the termini of the
world’s most critical networks.
We—not our enemies—must fight from the strongholds of the future. To do
so will require a profound comprehension of tomorrow’s battlespace, from the
complexities of urban combat to the intricacies of orbital dynamics, and from
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the details of electromagnetic propagation to the subtleties of an adversary’s
motivations. Will we be able to establish strongholds wherever and whenever
the United States may need them? That is the challenge now being posed to tomorrow’s leaders.

ARTHUR K. CEBROWSKI

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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